Based on nationally representative public opinion survey data collected in South Korea in 2024, this study systematically analyzes Korean public perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the mechanisms shaping those perceptions. The findings reveal a paradoxical cognitive pattern characterized by the coexistence of relatively high awareness and deep-seated misunderstanding. On the one hand, the overall cognitive foundation remains weak: more than half of respondents lack a clear understanding of the BRI, with limited knowledge of its basic content, developmental objectives, and potential impacts. Information acquisition is uneven, and public familiarity with the policy background and strategic intentions of the initiative remains insufficient, resulting in a fragile overall cognitive framework. On the other hand, groups with comparatively higher levels of awareness—such as men, individuals with higher educational attainment, and the baby boomer generation—are more likely to accept negative narrative frames that interpret the BRI as a tool for China to expand its global influence and pursue hegemony. This indicates a non-linear relationship between knowledge level and attitudes and reflects the effects of selective information exposure and preexisting cognitive biases. Further analysis demonstrates that political orientation, generational differences, and direct experience with China are key variables shaping public perceptions. Respondents with progressive political orientations, members of the MZ generation, and those with experience living, studying, or working in China exhibit significantly more positive evaluations of the BRI. In contrast, conservative groups and individuals without direct China-related experience tend to adopt skeptical or defensive attitudes, suggesting that perceptions are influenced not only by individual characteristics but also by socialization processes and cross-national contact. The study also finds that the cognitive challenges surrounding the BRI in South Korea stem from the combined effects of domestic political polarization, a specific information ecosystem, and Sino–U.S. strategic competition, producing a complex, multidimensional perception structure marked by both information deficits and systematic misinterpretations. This study concludes that while overall public awareness of the BRI in South Korea remains low, groups with progressive orientations, higher educational levels, and China-related experience demonstrate greater openness. Korean public attitudes toward future cooperation are ambivalent and shaped by domestic political polarization, information environments, and geopolitical rivalry. To improve public understanding, this study proposes differentiated strategies: for groups already exposed to the initiative but influenced by negative narratives, concrete facts and empirical data should be employed to clarify misconceptions and challenge entrenched cognitive frames; meanwhile, greater emphasis should be placed on “key groups” such as progressives, younger generations, and business communities that have shown relative openness, by expanding direct exchanges and experiential contact. Through people-to-people connectivity, such efforts may help alleviate strategic anxieties and gradually foster a more balanced, objective, and interest-based perception of the BRI. This study provides empirical evidence for understanding the challenges of mutual public trust between China and South Korea and offers strategic implications for targeted communication and sustainable cooperation under the BRI framework.
